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Abstract 
The precautionary principle has been adopted in such a widespread fashion that it is now difficult to find 
in either the international environmental arena or countries with advanced environmental protection 
frameworks an environmental policy document, a new environmental law, or even a political statement 
about environmental management that does not include a reference to the principle or reflect some of the 
core ideas of the precautionary concept. References to the principle can be found in documents produced 
by organizations such as the European Environment Agency, the World Trade Organization, and of course 
the United Nations; in numerous environmental treaties ranging from the management of straddling fish 
stocks to the prevention of pollution in the North Sea; in domestic and provincial environmental 
legislation; as well as in a plethora of domestic environmental policies and strategies. That the 
precautionary principle/approach is commonplace internationally (and, in fact, is considered by many to 
have crystallized into a norm of customary international law) and in domestic jurisdictions, is a testament 
to the soundness of the concept and the usefulness of considering precaution when devising 
environmental management and protection strategies. 
Keywords 




Gullett, W, The precautionary principle in Australia: policy, law and potential precautionary EIAs, Risk: 
Health, Safety and Environment, 11(2), 2000, 93-124. 
This journal article is available at Research Online: https://ro.uow.edu.au/lawpapers/126 
HeinOnline -- 11 Risk 93 2000
The Precautionary Principle in Australia: 
Policy, Law & Potential Precautionary EIAs* 
Warwick Gullett ** 
Introduction 
The precautionary principle has been adopted in such a widespread 
fashion that it is now difficult to find in either the international 
environmental arena or countries with advanced environmental 
protection frameworks an environmental policy document, a new 
environmental law, or even a political statement about environmental 
management that does not include a reference to the principle or reflect 
some of the core ideas of the precautionary concept. References to the 
principle can be found in documents produced by organizations such as 
the European Environment Agency, 1 the World Trade 
Organization,2 and of course the United Nations;3 in numerous 
environmental treaties ranging from the management of straddling fish 
stocks4 to the prevention of pollution in the North Sea;5 in 
* A version of this paper was presented at the Second Biennial International 
Meeting of the Risk Assessment and Policy Association (RAPA), Alexandria, VA, 
March 25-26, 1999. 
** Warwick Gullett holds a B.A. (Hons) and L.L.B. from Monash University and is 
completing his doctorate in the School of Resource Management and Environmental 
Science at the Australian National University. In 1999, he was a Visiting Fellow with 
the York Centre for Applied Sustainability, Faculty of Environmental Studies, York 
University. Email: warwick.gullett@anu.edu.au. 
1 See EEA Scientific Committee meeting and report, Practical Applications of the 
Precautionary Principle, Copenhagen, May 20, 1999. 
2 See Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures 
(1998), Article 5(7). 
3 See Rio Declaration on Environment and Development (1992), Principle 15. 
4 See, e.g., the 1995 Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the 
United States Convention on the Law of the Sea of December 10, 1982 Relating to 
the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory 
Fish Stocks. The precautionary aspects of the Agreement are discussed in detail in 
David Freestone & Zen Makuch, The New International Environmental Law of 
Fisheries: The 1995 United Nations Straddling Stocks Agreement, 7 Y.B. of Int'l 
Envtl. L. 3 (1996). 
5 See London Declaration of the Second International Conference on the 
Protection of the North Sea (1987). For discussion of the inclusion of the 
precautionary concept in environmental treaties, see Jay E. Hickey, Jr. & Vern R. 
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domestic and provincial environmental legislation;6 as well as in a 
plethora of domestic environmental policies and strategies.7 That the 
precautionary principle/approach is commonplace internationally (and, 
in fact, is considered by many to have crystallized into a norm of 
customary international law) and in domestic jurisdictions, is a 
testament to the soundness of the concept and the usefulness of 
considering precaution when devising environmental management and 
protection strategies. 
At its broadest level, the precautionary principle can be understood 
as a crystallization of numerous concerns about the nature of modern 
development, ranging from concern about the cumulative, long-term 
and distant effects of activities to the lowly status often accorded to 
environmental and health issues in public administration. Critics of the 
principle have expressed the view that the reason it is popular is because 
it has "rhetorical appeal.,,8 Some advocates also see the concept as 
being politically attractive, so long as it continues to be "tantalisingly 
ill-defined and imperfectly translatable into codes of conduct, whilst 
capturing the emotions of misgiving and guilt."9 While there is no 
Walker, Refining the Precautionary Principle in International Environmental Law, 14 
V. Envtl. 1. J. 423 (1995) and Warwick Gullett, Environmental Protection and the 
'Precautionary Principle': A Response to Scientific Uncertainty in Environmental 
Management, 14 EnVtl. & Planning 1. J. 52 (1997). 
6 In Canada, see e.g., Environment Act, R.S.N.S., § 2(a)(ii) (1994-95) (Nova 
Scotia), Sustainable Development and Consequential Amendments Act, R.S.M., § 
3(1), Sched. A4 (1998) (Manitoba), and the proposed amended preamble to the 
Canadian Environmental Protection Act of 1997 that is, at the time of writing, 
before the House of Commons (2nd Session, 35th Parliament, 45 Elizabeth II, 1996-
97, Bill C-74). The most recent innovative inclusion of the principle in a Bill before 
parliament is contained in the Massachusetts Precautionary Principle Bill which aims 
to establish the principle of precautionary action as 'the guideline for developing 
environmental policy and quality standards'. The innovative aspect of the Bill is that it 
uses mandatory language in relation to the application of the principle by employing 
the auxiliary 'shall'. (The long title of the Bill is "An Act to Establish the Principle of 
Precautionary Action as the Guideline for Developing Environmental Policy and 
Quality Standards for the Commonwealth," House No. 1998 (Mass. 1999)). 
7 See infra for discussion of Australian environmental policy documents 
containing the principle. The principle is also entrenched in environmental policies of 
many other countries. Just one example is the Danish Government's 1995 Nature and 
Environment Policy Report. 
8 See, e.g., Frank B. Cross, Paradoxical Perils of the Precautionary Principle, 53 
Washington & Lee loR. 851, 859 (1996). 
9 Andrew Jordan & Timothy O'Riordan, The Precautionary Principle in 
Contemporary Environmental Policy and Politics, in Protecting Public Heafth and 
the Environment: Implementing the Precautionary Principle 5 (c. Raffensperger & J. 
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doubt that some encapsulations of the principle are attractive populist 
statements (who can deny the statement "It's better to err on the side 
of caution"), overuse of such statements contribute to the perception 
that the principle is simply a pleasant-sounding but vacuous concept. 
The debate tends to overlook the growing recognition that the principle 
has far more substance to it than is indicated, for example, in the oft-
quoted misstatement that it simply prohibits development projects 
wherever there is uncertainty. The principle does not equate a "no risk" 
policy but rather requires greater weight to be given to environmental 
and public health protection in the all too common situation where 
there is insufficient scientific information available upon which to base 
decisions. Its most specific instruction is for us to be responsive to 
problems created by scientific uncertainty. The two central elements of 
the principle are that we should be confident about predictions of 
future environmental effects of activities before allowing them and that 
we should not wait for conclusive proof of environmental harm before 
adopting appropriate remedial measures. 
Yet, the principle still faces considerable hurdles. Implementation 
remains problematic due to imprecise expressions of it in policy and 
law, the fundamental challenge it presents for environmental 
management, and the difficulty of making decisions in the face of 
scientific uncertainty. Also, as the need for precaution arises in 
circumstances where not all the facts are available, the principle's 
application will always take place to some degree in a political context. 
Fortunately, attention is being devoted to developing the necessary 
conceptual frameworks for advancing the concept as well as identifying 
the practical steps that can be taken to implement precaution. More 
theses, reports and articles are appearing that identify how precaution 
could be implemented and decision-points for doing so.10 
Tickner eds., 1999). 
10 See, e.g., Joanna Catherine Spencer Brown, Interpreting and Implementing the 
Precautionary Principle: The Management of Sulphide Bearing Materials in Nova 
Scotia (1997) {unpublished Master of Environmental Studies thesis, Dalhousie 
University (Halifax, Nova Scotia)); see also Adrian Deville & Ronnie Harding, 
Applying the Precautionary Principle (1998); Protecting Public Health and the 
Environment: Implementing the Precautionary Principle (Carolyn Raffensperger & 
Joel Tickner eds., 1999); see also Perspectives on the Precautionary Principle (Ronnie 
Harding & Elizabeth Fisher eds., 1999). 
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This article contributes to this process of facilitating the inclusion of 
the principle in decision-making with respect to the approvals process 
for large developments. It is submitted that environmental impact 
assessment (EIA) is a logical vehicle by which to give effect to the 
principle because it is a long-standing practice common in many 
jurisdictions and the context in which it is used is appropriate for 
considering precaution; namely, whether to proceed with development 
proposals in situations where uncertainty exists about future 
environmental effects. First, adaptive management is briefly discussed 
as a suitable heuristic framework for achieving sustainability objectives. 
The precautionary EIA process proposed here should be seen as part of 
this approach to effect adaptive responses to environmental exigencies. 
A review is then presented of Australia's experience with the principle in 
policy, legislation and case law to place this reform proposal in context 
of the principle's institutional setting. The common adoption of the 
principle in the environmental field is observed together with the need 
for more guidance for decision-makers to enable them to implement 
precaution. In response to this need for more formal instructions on 
how to implement precaution in decision-making processes, a three-step 
method is then suggested by which the principle could be integrated 
systematically in EIA.II 
Adaptive Institutions: A Note on Uncertainty, Risk and Precaution 
In recognition of irreducible uncertainty and complexity in 
ecosystems, ecologists have proposed that management interventions be 
framed as testable hypotheses with feedback mechanisms established so 
that management experience could inform system understanding and, 
thus, improvements in management. This notion of adaptive 
management envisages situations of multiple uses and stakeholders that 
incorporate learning dimensions whereby policy processes and 
institutions could adapt in a persistent yet flexible and informed 
manner. I2 Many challenges to existing decision-making frameworks 
11 Some of the material contained here is drawn from Gullett, supra note 5, and 
Wanvick Gullett, Environmental Impact Assessment and the Precautionary Principle: 
Legislating Caution in Environmental Protection, 5 Australian J. of Envtl. 
Management 146 (1998). 
12 See Stephen Dovers & Catherine Mobbs, An Alluring Prospect? Ecology, and 
the Requirements of Adaptive Management, in Frontiers in Ecology 39 (N. Klomp & 
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are presented by this concept, for example, in determining how to 
enable responsive approaches to the problems created by scientific 
uncertainty. ETA is a useful analytical tool to utilize because of the 
opportunity it provides for public participation as an integral part of an 
informed decision-making process which is ongoing and responsive. 
This paper focuses on reforming an established, discrete decision-
making structure to embody the precautionary principle, yet 
application of the principle is set to take place within the context of 
broader policy and institutional settings. Approaches to uncertainty 
developed as part of such institutional evolution will need to have 
regard to adaptive processes, thus providing new settings for the 
application and interpretation of the precautionary principle. 13 One 
area of relevance here is risk management and the established process of 
risk assessment. Management decisions based on risk assessment can be 
considered to be preventative insofar as issues and projects are 
examined prior to their implementation. However, it is important to 
recognize that uncertainty analysis - which the precautionary principle 
requires - goes beyond risk assessment which focuses on identifiable 
hazards and, for many problems, is quite reductionist. An unavoidable 
but sometimes overlooked shortcoming of risk assessment is that rarely, 
if ever, is full scientific certainty achieved in relation to predictions of 
environmental outcomes. This is due to the combination of the 
difficulties associated with analyzing complex natural systems and the 
nature of scientific inquiry itself. Ambiguity, subjectivity and 
assumptions are inherent in scientific methods and interpretations. 
Uncertainty is not defined simply by the absence of "objective" 
scientific knowledge. It is partly a social construct insofar as it involves 
approaches to information affected by, among other things, taboo, 
distortion, irrelevance and confusion. 14 Uncertainty is more 
1. Lunt eds., 1997). 
13 See Elizabeth Fisher & Ronnie Harding, The Precautionary Principle: Towards 
a Deliberative, Transdisciplinary Problem-Solving Process, in Perspectives on the 
Precautionary Principle 290 (R. Harding & E. Fisher eds., 1999). 
14 See Michael Smithson, Ignorance and Uncertainty: Emerging Paradigms 
(1989); Brian Wynne, Uncertainty and Environmental Learning: Reconceiving 
Science in the Preventative Paradigm, 2 Global Envtl. Change 111 (1992); Stephen 
Dovers & John Handmer, Ignorance, the Precautionary Principle, and Sustainability, 
24 Ambio 92 (1995); and Stephen Dovers & Warwick GuIrett, Policy Choice for 
Sustainability: Marketization, Law and Institutions, in Environmental Justice and 
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commonly encountered than risk, but often the situation is better 
described as one of ignorance, even where there is some uncertainty 
about the direction of change (for example, regional impacts of climate 
change).15 In sum, uncertainty can exist where the likely direction of 
change is known, but probability distributions cannot be assigned to 
outcomes, as can be done with risk. 
Certainly risk assessment is necessary for the precautionary principle 
due to the need to identify and analyze the risks, costs and benefits 
associated with issues and projects. Yet a broader approach is necessary, 
one that would, for example, take into account cumulative effects and 
strategic planning. Specifically, a more explicit attempt to include 
uncertainty analysis is needed to make the existing, rather narrow-
focused risk assessment process truly precautionary. The need to 
consider uncertainty is not satisfied by the current practice of building 
pessimistic assumptions into risk assessments because the focus remains 
on risks, which are, by definition, outcomes that are identifiable and 
quantifiable, rather than largely unknown. Risk assessments are 
preventative, and the distinction between "prevention" and "precaution" 
is important. Prevention deals with avoiding an identifiable threat, 
whereas precaution is aimed at avoiding uncertain outcomes which 
may, or may not, be harmful (although there must be some reason to 
believe that harm may occur). The precautionary principle is innovative 
because it encompasses the preventative aspects of traditional regulatory 
approaches, but also justifies acting in advance of knowledge where 
outcomes are uncertain; that is, before a perceived threat becomes a 
known risk. 
Another limitation of risk assessments as currently practiced is that 
they tend to simplify available information due to the constraints of 
decision-making, thus obscuring the limitations of the available 
information. A message that needs to be underscored is that the 
numerical estimates provided in risk assessments of probability and 
severity of harm can create "a false security that the numbers derived 
are legitimate and correct"16 when, in fact, there are significant parts 
Market Mechanisms: Key Challenges for Environmental Law and Policy 110 (K. 
Bosselmann & B.J. Richardson eds., 1999). 
15 See Smithson, id. 
16 Allison R. Denning, Formulating a Publicly Acceptable Risk-Based Management 
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of the process which are non-scientific and subjective. The 
precautionary principle is relevant here because it encourages more 
critical examination of scientific information by reminding us of the 
subjective and imprecise nature of many scientific endeavors. 
Recognition of the broader nature of uncertainty presents the 
challenge of devising methods to deal with its wide-ranging 
ramifications. What is dealt with here is a proposal to give effect to the 
principle by reforming an existing environmental management tool: 
ETA. The institutional setting of the precautionary principle in Australia 
is used to frame this approach. Although the measures suggested here 
do not purport to solve the complex problems created by uncertainty 
and meeting the challenges presented by adaptive management, it is 
submitted that they are a necessary practical step towards more 
precautionary and adaptive environmental decision-making. 
Adoption of the Precautionary Principle in Australia 
There has been considerable interest in Australia's experience with 
the precautionary principle due to the early and systematic inclusion of 
it in environmental policy documents and legislation and the status 
accorded to it by the courts. This section reviews this experience and 
shows that the adoption of the principle in Australia is better 
characterized as widespread, rather than innovative. 
Inclusion in Policy Documents 
The precautionary principle was firmly established in Australia with 
the signing, in May 1992, of the Intergovernmental Agreement on the 
Environment (IGAE)17 by the Commonwealth, States and Territories 
and the Australian Local Government Association.18 Although as a 
Approach to Decision-Making for the Nova Scotia Department of the Environment 
26 (unpublished Master of Environmental Studies thesis, Dalhousie University 
(Halifax, Nova Scotia)). 
17 The IGAE set up a framework for improved environmental management 
throughout Australia. It aims to provide a mechanism to facilitate a co-operative 
national approach to the environment, better definition of the roles of the respective 
governments, greater certainty in decision-making and better environmental 
protection. 
18 Australia has a federal system of government which consists of the Federal (or 
Commonwealth) government and the governments of the six states and two 
territories. There also exists another level of government: local government. Many 
environmental responsibilites which had been the purview of state governments in the 
period following federation now rest with local government. In effect, there are three 
11 Risk: Health, Safety & Environment 93 [Spring 2000] 
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political accord the IGAE is not legally binding on the parties, it is 
influential because it is the highest level of environmental policy 
commitment that exists between all three spheres of government 
(federal, state and local). The precautionary principle is listed as one of 
four principles intended to inform environmental policy and programs 
within the purview of each of the parties, thus covering all Australian 
public environmental policy and management decisions. Under clause 
3.5.1, the parties agreed that, "Where there are threats of serious or 
irreversible environmental damage, lack of full scientific certainty 
should not be used as a reason for postponing measures to prevent 
environmental degradation." This is the traditional formulation of the 
principle - closely resembling that contained in the 1992 Rio 
Declaration - which embodies the notion that cautious actions should 
be taken whenever uncertain environmental risks are encountered. 
However, the IGAE expands upon this core requirement. "In the 
application of the precautionary principle, public and private decisions 
should be guided by: 19 
(i) careful evaluation to avoid, wherever practicable, serious or 
irreversible damage to the environment; and 
(ii) an assessment of the risk-weighted consequences of various 
. " options. 
Schedules to the Agreement identify specific areas of policy and 
management where the principle "should" be applied. These are: 
• data collection and handling; 
• resource assessment, land use and approval processes; 
• environmental impact assessment; 
• national environment protection measures; 
• climate change; 
• biological diversity; 
• national estate; 
• World Heritage; and 
• nature conservation. 
levels of government with environmental responsibilities. See Timothy Doyle & 
Aynsley Kellow, Environmental Politics and Policy Making in Australia 145 (1995). 
19 Commonwealth of Australia, Intergovernmental Agreement on the Environment 
(May 1992). 
HeinOnline -- 11 Risk 101 2000
Gullett: Precautionary Principle 101 
Part (ii) above is an important expansion to the Rio Declaration 
formulation because it gives more substance to the principle by 
indicating that precaution requires careful assessment of various 
management options and that they be balanced in any final decision. 
However, it does not greatly assist implementation of the principle or 
remove confusion about its content because further necessary detail is 
lacking about exactly how, for example, decision-makers should assess 
"risk-weighted consequences." Another concern with this formulation 
of the principle is that it is phrased in preventive rather than 
precautionary language. It does this by focusing on risk (including 
"serious" and "irreversible" damage) rather than uncertainty, which, as 
explained above, is the essence of the principle. 
Another important document which includes the principle is the 
National Strategy for Ecologically Sustainable Development,20 also 
released in 1992, which outlines essential approaches for achieving 
ecologically sustainable development (ESD) (Australia's version of 
"sustainable development"). Some of these approaches are consistent 
with precaution, such as considering national implications of local 
activities and taking long-term rather than short-term views in 
environmental decision-making. The Strategy, although not employing 
the term "precautionary principle," does adopt the principle by 
mirroring the first part of the IGAE definition. 
The recognition of pervasive and irreducible risk and uncertainty 
associated with sustainability issues is leading to a crucial rethinking of 
approaches to environmental management. At a practical level, the 
Australian Standard/New Zealand Standard 4360 Risk Management 
has been developed for generic use in risk assessment and management. 
Given the IGAE definition of the precautionary principle to include 
"risk-weighted assessments," the Risk Management Standard may well 
become a major mechanism for interpreting whether the principle has 
been adequately applied in decision processes, as it is the only 
formalized framework available. Proposals to insert widely applicable 
"duty of care" provisions in resource and environmental laws in 
Australia state that principles of risk identification, prediction and 
management would be central to such legal reform.21 The principle's 
20 Commonwealth of Australia, National Strategy for Ecologically Sustainable 
Development (1992). 
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prevalence in Australia is evidenced by its inclusion in numerous specific 
Commonwealth and State environmental policy documents,22 as well 
as overarching policy documents such as the IGAE and the National 
Strategy for Ecologically Sustainable Development (NSESD). It is now 
rare for an environmental policy document not to mention the principle 
or to adopt it implicitly by referring to ESD. 
Inclusion in Legislation 
In the later part of the 1990s, the precautionary principle appeared 
in Australian statutes with increasing frequency. Due to its now 
entrenched status in Australian environmental policy, it is normally 
mentioned in some form in new statutes dealing with environmental 
protection. Further, a number of provisions in environmental legislation 
enacted prior to the principle's widespread adoption in policy 
instruments in the early 1990s have been updated to include the 
principle. For example, an important reference to it in Commonwealth 
legislation is contained in the Environment, Sports and Territories 
Legislation Amendment Act, 1995, § 31 (Cth), which amended the 
Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Act, 1975, § 39z (Cth) to require the 
Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Authority to be informed by the 
principle in preparing management plans and protecting World 
Heritage values. The Act adopts the IGAE definition of the principle. 
In addition, the Fisheries Legislation Amendment Act, 1997, Sched. 2 
(Cth) amended the Fisheries Management Act, 1991, § 3(I)(b) (Cth) 
to provide that the Minister, in the administration of the Act (and the 
Australian Fisheries Management Authority in the performance of its 
functions), "must" pursue the objective of:23 
ensuring that the exploitation of fisheries resources and the 
carrying on of any related activities are conducted in a 
21 See Industry Commission, A Full Repairing Lease: Inquiry into Sustainable Land 
Management, Report no. 60 (1998). (I thank Stephen Dovers for suggesting this to 
me.) 
22 These include the Guiding Principles for the Sustainable Management of Coastal 
Resources, the National Strategy for Rangeland Management, the National Strategy 
for the Conservation of Australia's Biological Diversiry, the National Waste 
Minimisation and Recycling Strategy, the National Greenhouse Response Strategy, 
and the Tasmanian State Policy on Water Policy Management. 
23 The principle is also contained in the Ozone Protection Act, 1989 (Cth) by way 
of the inclusion in Schedule 3 of the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete 
the Ozone Layer. 
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manner consistent with the principles of ecologically 
sustainable development and the exercise of the 
precautionary principle, in particular the need to have 
regard to the impact of fishing activities on non-target 
species and the long term sustainability of the marine 
environment. 
The most recent Commonwealth inclusion of the principle is 
contained in the Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation 
Act, 1999 (EPBC Act). Section 391 is the most progressive legislative 
inclusion of the principle in Australia. The section provides that the 
Minister "must take account of the precautionary principle" in making 
any of the 16 specific decisions listed in Section 391(3).24 These 
decisions include whether to approve projects or developments and 
decisions relating to conservation and management plans. The 
innovative nature of the provision is that it requires consideration of the 
principle in situations deemed appropriate. Therefore, the principle is 
now a matter that must be taken into account for these decisions, rather 
than a matter that may be taken into account. The provision will do 
much to entrench precautionary thinking at the highest level of 
environmental decision-making and will provide a firmer basis for 
litigants to argue that application of precaution is necessary in certain 
cases. The formulation of the principle adopted is a reworded, but 
substantively identical, version of that contained in the IGAE. 
Regrettably, the opportunity was not taken to provide a stronger and 
more precise definition of the principle. This is unfortunate, considering 
that the Act is the main product of a large-scale review of 
Commonwealth environmental law and will be the pivotal piece of 
Commonwealth environmental legislation. Among other things, it 
provides the new legislative basis for federal EIA. Section 391(2) which 
states, "The precautionary principle is that lack of full scientific 
certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing a measure to 
24 A curious proviso is contained in § 391(1): the Minister need only consider the 
principle "to the extent he or she can do so consistently with the other provisions of 
this Act." It is difficult to imagine a situation in which the mere "consideration" of the 
principle could be inconsistent with other provisions in the Bill. Perhaps this proviso 
indicates legislative contemplation that the principle would largely be applied to some 
degree. Consider also that Part 16, in which the section is located, is titled 
"Application of precautionary principle in decision-making." 
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prevent degradation of the environment where there are threats of 
serious or irreversible environmental damage." 
Although the principle is espoused in a handful of Commonwealth 
Acts, there has been greater explicit endorsement of precaution in State 
legislation. This is because authority to legislate on environmental 
matters is traditionally the preserve of the State parliaments because 
they have authority to legislate on matters not specifically reserved to 
the Commonwealth parliament by the Australian Constitution. The 
conventional view is that the Commonwealth has no environmental 
power (or at least no exclusive environmental jurisdiction) due to the 
absence of a head of power specifically dealing with environmental 
matters in §§51 or 52 of the Constitution.25 The first legislative 
inclusion of the principle in Australia is found in the New South Wales 
(NSW) Protection of the Environment Administration Act, 1991. 
Section 6(2) outlines the principles of ESD and specifies that it can be 
achieved, in part, by implementing "the precautionary principle, 
namely, that if there are threats of serious or irreversible environmental 
damage, lack of full scientific certainty should not be used as a reason 
for postponing measures to prevent environmental degradation." This 
section is referred to in many subsequent NSW statutes where the 
Parliament considered that principles of ESD should be complied with 
in other fields. 26 An early inclusion of the principle is found in the 
Environment Protection Act, 1993 (SA). The objectives of the Act 
include ensuring that "all reasonable and practicable measures are taken 
to protect, restore and enhance the quality of the environment having 
25 In the period 1976 to 1989, a number of legal challenges regarding the 
constitutional validity of Commonwealth environmentaI legislation were prosecuted. 
The High Court of Australia delivered four pivotal decisions incorporating expansive 
interpretations of a number of relevant heads of Commonwealth power and upheld 
the validity of each enactment challenged (see e.g., Murphyores Inc. Pty. Ltd. v. 
Commonwealth (1976) 136 C.L.R. 1). It confirmed that the main source of 
Commonwealth environmental power relates to the implementation of obligations in 
treaties, or (in the absence of a treaty) in the more problematic concept of legitimate 
"international concern" (see Koowarta v. Bjelke-Petersen (1982) 153 C.L.R. 168, 
220). 
26 See, e.g., Coastal Protection Act, 1979, § 54A; Environmental Planning and 
Assessment Act, 1979, § 112D(g); Energy Services Corporations Act, 1995, §§ 
5(1)(b), 8(1)(b); Fire Brigades Act, 1989, § lOA; Gas Supply Act, 1996, § 3(1)(a); 
National Parks and Wildlife Act, 1974, § 91CC(2)(a); Threatened Species 
Conservation Act, 1995, § 4(l)(b); and Waste Minimisation and Management Act, 
1995, § 3(2)(h). 
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regard to the principles of ESD" and "to apply a precautionary 
approach to the assessment of risk of environmental harm."27 
Despite the appearance of the principle in Australian legislation with 
environmental matters, specific references to the principle, separate 
from its inclusion as a major component of ESD, are rare. The principle 
is contained in statutes as a specifically mentioned component of ESD 
or by way of inclusion of the IGAE in schedule sections of legislation. 
Australian examples include: 
• Environment Protection Act, 1997, § 3(2)(a) (ACT); 
• Gungahlin Development Authority Act, 1996, §7(3)(a) (ACT); 
• National Environment Protection Council Act, 1994, Sched. 1 
(Cth); 
• Contaminated Land Management Act, 1997, §10(2)(a) (NSW); 
• Local Government Amendment (Ecologically Sustainable 
Development) Act, 1997, Sched. 1 (NSW); 
• Native Vegetation Conservation Act, 1997, §4(2)(a) (NSW). 
Some Acts do not specifically refer to the principle but enable 
consideration to be given the essence of the principle by, e.g., 
prohibiting the postponement of measures to prevent environmental 
degradation simply due to an absence of scientific certainty with 
respect to threats of causing serious or irreversible damage.2s There is a 
compelling argument that legislative intent requires decision-makers to 
consider the principle, even where it is not specifically referred to in 
legislation. As precaution is accepted as a guiding principle of ESD, it 
must be recognized as implicit in any statement of ESD.29 References 
to ESD in legislation would entail a consideration of the principle.30 
1J Section 10(1)(b)(iv). 
28 See, e.g., Natural Heritage Trust of Australia Act, 1997, § 21(3)(b)(ii) (Cth). 
The existence of the principle in Australian legislation is extensive when one considers 
the 75 Commonwealth, state and territory statutes that include the ecologically 
sustainable development (ESD) concept (which includes the principle) and the 30 
proceedings in courts and tribunals that have dealt with these J>rinciples. See Greg 
Rose, Implementation of the Rio Principles in Australia, Papers from the Workshop 
on National Implementation of the Principles Contained in The Rio Declaration on 
Environment and Development, U.N. Dept. of Economic and Social Affairs, Jan. 12-
14,1999. 
29 See Ronnie Harding & Liz Fisher, The Precautionary Principle in Australia, in 
Interyreting the Precautionary Principle 252, 257 (T. O'Riordan & J. Cameron eds., 
1994). 
30 Acts which fall into this category include the Endangered Species Protection 
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A recent inclusion of a version of the principle is contained in the 
NSW State Environmental Planning Policy No. 58 - Protecting 
Sydney's Water Supply issued under the Environmental Planning and 
Assessment Act, 1979 (NSW).31 The Policy, which commenced 
effect on February 1, 1999, provides that for any development that has 
significant potential to impact on drinking water quality in Sydney's 
catchment, the developer will need to provide evidence that the 
development will have either a neutral or beneficial impact on water 
quality and that the methods of containing and treating any pollutants 
generated are sustainable in the long term. Neither the precautionary 
principle nor scientific uncertainty are mentioned in the Policy. 
However, the Policy embodies a strong version of precaution in the 
sense that it places an obligation on the developer to establish that the 
proposed development will not adversely impact on water quality. 32 
Approval can be refused on the grounds that a developer has not 
furnished the consent authority with an assessment of these matters. 
Although the inclusion of the precautionary principle in Australian 
legislation is widespread (particularly in relation to other developed 
countries), the formulations of it in statutes are not strong. The new 
EPBC Act, 1999, is a notable exception insofar as it provides for 
mandatory consideration of the principle, although it provides a 
relatively weak version of precaution. Most existing acts adopt the 
IGAE definition, which is itself only a slightly expanded form of the 
rather weak Rio Declaration version. As such, current legislative 
incorporations of the principle in Australia are worded generally and 
reflect an intent to advance precautionary decision-making but not to 
mandate particular environmental outcomes based on precautionary 
criteria. Legislators have not turned their attention to clearly expressing 
the principle so that it will be implemented in discrete cases. 
Act, 1992, §§ 32(3)(c), 34(3)(c), 60, 70, 81 (Cth); Natural Resources Management 
(Financial Assistance) Act, 1992, § 3(2) (b) (Cth); and the Agricultural and 
Veterinary Chemicals (Northern Territory) Act, 1995, preamble (NT). 
31 New South Wales Government Gazette no. 178 at 10163 (December 24, 1998). 
See also Minister for Urban Affairs and Planning, Minister for Housing (NSW) , 
Tough New Policy to Safeguard Sydney's Drinking Water, News Release, Dec. 24, 
1998. 
32 Also, Clause 12 of the Policy contains a notification requirement where a 
pro~osed development has less than a "significant" potential to impact on water 
quality. 
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To date, in Australia, the principle's most important test -
implementation - has been bedevilled by problems. This is due, in 
large part, to concerns by industry groups that there should be certainty 
concerning the principle's implementation. Governments, being 
concerned about reducing investment opportunities, have been cautious 
about adopting strict versions of precaution and, thus, we see the 
prevalence of "let-out" phrases in virtually all legislative examples of the 
principle (including the words "wherever practicable" in the IGAE 
formulation supra). The principle typically is either contained in non-
operative provisions of legislation or it is relaxed and expressed in 
permissive terms. As such, existing Australian legislative and policy 
enunciations of the principle are of limited practical use due to their 
ambiguity; decision-makers are not bound to apply the principle, and 
are in doubt as to how to do so. Although the federal government has 
embraced the principle internationally and domestically, the current 
practice of repeatedly espousing the principle as a guide to 
environmental decision-making is not sufficient to discharge the 
Commonwealth's obligation to ensure that the precautionary approach 
is "widely applied."33 
Judicial Application 
The true test of effectiveness of the principle is not simply the 
inclusion of it in legislation, but rather the willingness of the courts to 
uphold its application as expressed in statutes.34 However, due to the 
weak incorporation of it in Australian legislation, there is little 
Australian jurisprudence on the principle. It has been judicially 
considered in a handful of cases, most notably in a series of decisions of 
the NSW Land and Environment Court, and more recently, by the 
Federal Court of Australia in the Friends of Hinchinbrook case.35 
The first and most significant judicial consideration of the principle 
was in 1993 by Judge Stein in the NSW Land and Environment Court 
III Leatch v. National Parks and Wildlife Service.36 His Honour 
33 See Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, supra note 3. 
34 See Harding & Fisher, supra note 29, at 255. 
35 Friends of Hinchinbrook Society Inc. v. Minister for Environment (1997) 69 
F.C.R. 28. See Rosemary Lyster, The Relevance of the Precautionary Principle: 
Friends of Hinchinbrook Society Inc. v. Minister for Environment, 14 Envtl. & 
Planning L. J. 390 (1997) and GUllett, supra note 11, at 155. 
36 81 L.G.E.R.A. 270 (1993). The decision in Leatch has been referred to in most 
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noted the inclusion of the principle in government strategies and 
legislation, and while stating that there was no express legislative 
provision requiring the consideration of the principle in the matter 
before him, refused a license for a road through an area of endangered 
species habitat because of uncertainty as to impacts on the species and 
lack of consideration of alternatives. He stated that "the precautionary 
principle is a statement of commonsense ... where uncertainty or 
ignorance exists ... decision makers should be cautious."37 This is an 
example of how the principle can operate as a determining factor in 
environmental decisions. 
However, optimism that the NSW Land and Environment Court 
was going to establish a firm basis for the application of the principle 
was shaken by obiter dicta in a decision less than one year later. In 
Nicholls v. Director General of National Parks and Wildlife 
Service,38 a case concerning the same legislative provision that was 
considered in Leatch,39 a sharply contrasting judgment was delivered. 
At issue was the applicant's contention that the precautionary principle 
should be invoked to refuse the granting of a license for forestry 
operations to "take or kill" endangered fauna because there were 
shortcomings in the fauna impact statement (required to accompany 
any application for such a license) which prevented the determination of 
appropriate ameliorative measures as required by the Act. Judge Talbot 
stated that the applicant's contention went beyond that argued and 
endorsed in Leatch and upheld the issuance of the license. He 
continued:40 
[T]he statement of the precautionary principle, while it may 
be framed appropriately for the purpose of a political 
subsequent Australian judicial decisions which discuss the principle. It was considered 
by the High Court in R. v. Secretary of State for Trade and Industry ex parte 
Duddridge (decision delivered 4 October 1994), although held to be of no relevance 
to English law. See David Hughes, The Status of the 'Precautionary Principle' in 
Law: R. v. Secretary of State for Trade and Industry ex parte Duddridge, 7 J. of 
Envtl. Law 224 (1995). 
37 !d. at 282-84. See also Gullett, supra note 5, at 62-64. 
38 84 L.G.E.R.A. 397 (1994). 
39 The definition of "take or kill" in National Parks and Wildlife Act, 1974, § 5 
(NSW) (since repealed). 
40 Nicholls, 84 L.G.E.R.A. at 419. 
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aspiration, its implication as a legal standard could have the 
potential to create interminable forensic argument. Taken 
literally in practice it might prove to be unworkable. Even 
the applicant concedes that scientific certainty is essentially 
impossible. It is only 500 years ago that most scientists were 
convinced the world was flat. 
Such differing interpretations are perhaps predictable in these early days 
of the principle's incorporation in domestic law, but they reinforce the 
inoperational nature of the principle as currently expressed in legislation 
and policy documents. 
Despite the absence of legislative expression of an enforceable 
standard of precaution, since 1997, the principle has been argued in 
court cases more frequently, mostly by applicants or respondents 
seeking to have planning decisions influenced by precaution. For 
example, in Grishin v. Conservator of Flora and Fauna,41 the applicant 
sought a review of the decision not to allow her to ride a horse in a 
designated nature reserve. The respondent, in seeking to have the 
decision upheld, argued that the precautionary principle should apply 
to the decision. The Australian Capital Territory (ACT) Administrative 
Appeals Tribunal stated:42 
We ... believe that the adoption of a cautious approach to 
the protection of the environment is consistent with the 
object and purpose of the Nature Conservation Act [ACT 
1980] and the management objectives applying to Aranda 
Bushland. However it is a matter of judgement as to 
whether the granting of permission to take horses into 
Aranda Bushland at the present time would be incautious. 
The tribunal considered evidence given by an expert witness that 
baseline data should be obtained so that there could be scientific 
measurement and evaluation of any future environmental impact by 
horses on the land. In summarizing the evidence, the tribunal stated 
that it appeared that "well-controlled and cared for horses pose only a 
small risk. ,,43 
41 [1998] AC.T.A.A.T. 250 (23 April 1998). 
42 Id. para 15. 
43 Id. para 21. 
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The tribunal stated further that it was not persuaded:44 
that horses admitted under the controls envisaged ... would 
contribute significantly to soil erosion. However the 
possibility that they may carry weed seeds into the Aranda 
Bushland and that the seed growth may be promoted by 
horse manure cannot be ruled out, particularly if horses 
step off the formed gravel tracks. 
In deciding to uphold the decision, the tribunal regarded the 
"desirability" of first obtaining baseline scientific data so that there 
could be assessment of any future impact of horses on the Aranda 
Bushland. Quite remarkably, the tribunal based its decision, in part, on 
precaution. It did so even though it was not certain that the activity in 
question would cause significant harm. It was sufficient to base the 
decision on the mere possibility of harm being caused, given that this 
approach was consistent with the intent expressed in the relevant statute 
under which the decision was based.45 This recent administrative 
appeals case demonstrates that tribunals conducting merits review (but 
not necessarily courts conducting judicial review) of environmental 
decisions are prepared to consider arguments based on the 
precautionary principle.46 
Yet, even when courts find that the principle is a relevant (or rather, 
not an irrelevant) consideration, they seem not to be rigorous when 
considering whether decision-makers have acted with requisite caution 
in the absence of clear instructions to do so in legislation.47 This 
44 !d. 
45 What is also of note is that the Nature Conservation Act, 1980 (ACT) does not 
mention the precautionary principle or even ESD. 
46 See R. v. Resource Planning and Development Commission; ex parte Aquatas 
Pry. Ltd. (1998) T.A.S.S.C. 82 where, in reviewing a decision made by the Resource 
Planning and Development Commission, Cox, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of 
Tasmania stated that the Tasmanian State Coastal Policy, which includes the IGAE 
formulation of the principle, requires that, "[iJn the application of the principle, 
decisions must be guided by a proper process of evaluation to avoid damage and of 
assessment of the consequences of possible choices." However, on the facts his Honour 
held that the Commission's decision in the case did not conflict with the principle. 
Thus, the opportunity to quash the decision on precautionary grounds did not present 
itself. See alSo the decision of Judge Wright of the same court in R. v. Land Use 
Planning Review Panel; ex parte M. F. Cas. Pty. Ltd. (1998) T .A.S.S.c. 131. 
47 See, e.g., the decision of Judge Gallen in Greenpeace New Zealand Inc. v. 
Minister of Fisheries, Unreported, High Court of New Zealand, CP 492/93, Nov. 27, 
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indicates a still pressing need for clearer expressions of the principle and 
more debate by practitioners and theorists about what the principle 
should require in specific circumstances. Nonetheless, in Australia the 
principle has been afforded a degree of legal recognition by the courts 
and the legislature, as well as being endorsed routinely by all spheres of 
government in environmental policy commitments and by the majority 
of the professional literature. The increasingly high profile of the 
principle in these fora indicate that the necessary ingredients exist for it 
to evolve into a common law doctrine.48 It is now unlikely that, in the 
environmental arena, it could be held to be an irrelevant consideration. 
Indeed, Leatch established that the principle may need to be 
considered even if it is not included in the specific legislation upon 
which a matter is being litigated.49 Reinforcing this view are the 
statements of the High Court of Australia that there is a "legitimate 
expectation" that Commonwealth discretion will be exercised in 
conformity with the terms of international conventions to which 
Australia is a party,50 and there are numerous such conventions which 
embody the principle. Yet, more guidance is needed as to the 
circumstances in which the principle is, or should be, a consideration.51 
Given the vague language used in legislation enshrining the principle, 
the courts have been given an insubstantial mandate to enforce it. The 
formulation of the principle in the pieces of legislation which adopt it 
indicate that it is most likely to be applied as a general principle of 
statutory interpretation and not as a legally enforceable rule.52 Thus, 
the need for more specific operating instructions for applying 
precaution in environmental decision-making is clear. 
1995. The case is discussed in Sharon Mascher, Taking a 'Precautionary Approach': 
Fisheries Management in New Zealand, 14 Envtl. & Planning L. J. 70 (1997) and 
Gullett, supra note 5, at 63. 
48 See also Charmain Barton, The Status of the Precautionary Principle in 
Australia: Its Emergence in Legislation and as a Common Law Doctrine, 22 Harvard 
Envtl. L. R. 509, 535 (1998). 
49 See Stephen R. Dovers, Tony W. Norton, and John W. Handmer, 
Uncertainty, Ecology, Sustainability and Policy, 5 Biodiversity & Conservation 1143, 
1149 (1996). 
50 Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v. Teoh (1995) 183 C.L.R. 273 at 
287-88 per ChiefJustice Mason and Judge Deane; at 298-303 per Toohey, J.; at 303-
305 per Judge Gaudron. 
51 The inclusion of the principle in the EPBC Act, 1999, is welcome in this regard. 
52 See Gerry Bates, Editorial, 11 Envtl. & Planning L. J. 251, 253 (1994). 
11 Risk: Health, Safety & Environment 93 [Spring 2000] 
HeinOnline -- 11 Risk 112 2000
112 
Other Examples o/Precaution in Australia 
The Australian experience with the precautionary principle has been 
characterized by considerable conflict, particularly concerning 
environmental lobbyists and industries associated with resource 
extraction. This is because Australia has a resource-based economy, and 
application of the principle is seen by many to be a threat to resource 
security. 53 Industry groups continue to pressure governments to 
consider economic implications of environmental objectives.5 4 
Concerns expressed by these industries tend to mirror concerns 
expressed in other countries - that the principle requires the 
prohibition of activities where there is uncertainty. Thus, if precaution 
were to be adopted as a governing principle, development would be 
characterised by a "do nothing" approach.55 
However, this view is inconsistent with all formulations of the 
principle. The principle requires some indication that harm may result 
before the burden shifts to the proponent of an activity to negate the 
possibility of unacceptable harm. 56 There is, or should be, a quasi-
scientific threshold (differing according to the level of anticipated 
harm) which must be met in order for it to be necessary to consider the 
principle. However, even where there are grounds to implement 
precautionary measures, these still should be weighed against expected 
benefits, including economic, which may be foregone if a proposed 
activity is prohibited. Importantly, some benefits of implementing 
precaution are non-quantifiable (e.g., improvement in air quality), and 
53 See Harding & Fisher, supra note 29, at 253. Consider also the federal 
government's successful bid to have less onerous conditions placed on it at the 
greenhouse reduction meeting in Kyoto. See Clive Hamilton, Australia's Climate 
Change 'Victory': A Poisoned Chalice, 3 Ecological Econ. Bull. 10 (1998). 
54 See Gordon Drake, Precautionary Principle: A Mining Perspective. Paper 
presented ae the Precautionary Principle Conference, Institute of Environmental 
Studies, University of New South Wales, Sydney, Sepe. 20-21, 1993. For example, 
Drake notes that the Australian Mining Industry Council's position is that risk-taking 
should not be eliminated. It has argued that this is essential in human progress. 
55 See Ronald Brunton, We Must Adopt a Risk-Averse Approach and Always Err 
on the Side of Caution When Dealing with Environmental Issues, in Tall Green Tales 
29 a. Bennett ed., 1995); Hickey & Walker, supra note 5, at 425; and Ian Wills, 
The Environment, Information and the Precautionary Principle, 4 Agenda 51 (1997). 
56 This is particularly the case in weak formulations of the principle, such as in the 
Rio Declaration, where the threshold for application is threats of "serious or 
irreversible damage." 
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likewise it can be difficult to measure economic benefits of 
developments. Even though complete information is unobtainable, what 
information there is can be weighed in order to achieve a well-
considered decision appropriate for the context. Where the magnitude 
of uncertainty is large, more reliance on precaution is warranted. The 
fundamental misundetstanding about the principle - that it simply, and 
irrationally, stops development - and the rhetoric associated with it, 
indicates the need for more discussion and education about what the 
principle does, and does not, entai1.57 
Application of the principle has been advocated in areas other than 
the environmental field (including health concerns such as the 
uncertainty associated with cellular telephone towers). Arguably, the 
most important non-judicial decision made on precautionary grounds 
in Australia is that concerning the NSW government's rejection in 1996 
of a proposal to construct an open-cut gold mine in the Lake Cowal 
area in the central west region of the state. The area is a listed wetland 
under the National Estate58 and is considered by Commonwealth and 
state government agencies to meet criteria for listing under the Ramsar 
Convention59 and there is much uncertainty about the effects a mine 
would have on the environment. Notwithstanding this, a Commission 
of Inquiry found that likely environmental impacts were consistent with 
57 For further explanation of the principle, see Gullett, supra note 5. Events such as 
the Precautionary Principle conference held at the Institute of Environmental Studies 
at the University of New South Wales in 1993 and the Wingspread conference, 
Strategies for Implementing the Precautionary Principle, held in Racine, Wisconsin in 
1998 are important in this regard because they bring together a range of people from 
many disciplines, all of which are touched by the principle. See also arguments about 
the dangers of risk-tradeoffs and false positives (Type I' error) which have done much 
to undermine the precautionary principle by incorrectly asserting that the principle 
does not enable consideration of negative consequences of precaution. On this point, 
see Cross, supra note 8, and Jonathan Baert Wiener, Protecting the Global 
Environment, in Risk versus Risk: Tradeoffs in Protecting Health and the 
Environment 193 (J.D. Graham &J. B. Weiner eds., 1995). Type I and Type II errors 
are discussed in R. Michael M'Gonigle et al., Taking Uncertainty Seriously: From 
Permissive Regulation to Preventative Design in Environmental Decision Making, 32 
Osgoode Hall 1. J. 99 (1994). 
58 National Estate areas are protected by the Australian Heritage Commission 
under the Australian Heritage Commission Act, 1975 (Cth). Section 4 specifies that 
for a place to be listed on the National Estate, it must be part of Australia s natural or 
cultural environment and have aesthetic, historic, scientific or social significance or 
other special value for future generations as well as existing generations. 
59 Ramsar Convention on Wetlands of International Importance Especially as 
Waterfowl Habitat (1972). 
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planning and environmental guidelines,60 thus presenting the 
government with no legal hurdles with respect to the issuance of a 
development consent order. The decision of the government to act as it 
did in the face of pressure from the proponent, North Limited, as well 
as the Australian Workers' Union, is remarkable given that the proposal 
had met all necessary requirements and had satisfied a Commission of 
Inquiry. The government based its decision, in large part, on the 
grounds that only by refusing the proposal could unknown risks to a 
significant environment be avoided.61 Undoubtedly, other political 
factors influenced the decision to some degree, thus calling into 
question the strength of commitment to the principle espoused by the 
government. Notwithstanding this, the government's use of the 
precautionary language, in a context where the level of uncertainty 
made consideration of precaution appropriate, provides evidence that 
precautionary thinking has achieved legitimacy as a reasonable basis for 
public decision-making. 
More indirect versions of precaution are evident in other areas. For 
example, there has been considerable development in cleaner 
production and environmental management systems in the 1990s. 
Many corporations are seeking accreditation for the ISO 14000 series of 
standards which cover issues, such as life-cycle assessment and 
environmental auditing.62 Also, the inclusion of the principle in most 
state and federal environmental policy documents not only has 
influenced decisions by governments and ministerial authorities, but it 
also has influenced the recognition of it by professional organisations 
and corporations which, although not necessarily commiting themselves 
to the application of the principle, do adopt environmental policies 
which include ESD.63 However, more work needs to be done on 
determining other ways to implement precaution, such as subsidies or 
research grants for clean technology, waste minimization plans, safe 
minimum standards, prohibition or limited sale of certain products, 
injunctive remedies and adaptive management.64 The task is to 
~ See Deville & Harding, supra note 10 at 11. 
61 At the time of writing (mid 1999), a new development application for the mine is 
being considered. However, a number of aspects of the original proposal have been 
modified significantly. 
62 See Deville & Harding, supra note 10, at 21. 
63 !d. at 15-16. 
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recognise when and how to use different techniques appropriately to 
support decision-making in the face of scientific uncertainty. Decision-
makers need clear guidance as to the circumstances in which they need 
to adopt precautionary responses and they also need to know which 
methods to use. In this respect, after a development approval decision 
has been made, there is a need for courts to be empowered to ascertain 
what precautionary methods were used, and the reason for selecting 
them, as part of the process of assessing whether the principle was taken 
into account appropriately. 65 
On the whole, Australian environmental strategies tend to be 
cautiously preventative, rather than anticipatory and precautionary. The 
National Pollutant Inventory (NPI), established in 1996, is an example. 
The Commonwealth established the inventory - mainly a reporting 
and public disclosure exercise - of substances which are "known to, or 
reasonably expected to, cause serious health problems or severe damage 
to the environment," that is, only substances with a clearly identified 
hazard potential. 66 A truly precautionary approach would apply 
regulatory standards to substances about which there may still be 
uncertainty, a process known as "reverse listing."67 The focus should 
be to establish the principle as a mandatory consideration in 
environmental matters. This has, in late 1999, been achieved for certain 
decisions made under the EPBC Act, however, in many other contexts 
decision-makers can ignore the principle in circumstances in which its 
consideration or application is appropriate. A compounding factor is 
that existing law in property and torts in this regard is far from 
precautionary because it is heavily influenced by the assimilative 
capacity approach which holds that the environment can tolerate certain 
64 For more detail on the techniques available to support decision-making in the 
face of scientific uncertainty, including the 1995 Risk Management Standard 
(AS/NZS 4360), see Dovers et al., supra note 49. 
65 For a discussion of how courtS should substantively review expert decisions made 
under scientific uncertainty, see Elizabeth Fisher, Risk, Expertise and Judicial Review: 
Scope of Review and Decision Making Under Scientific Uncertainty (1998) 
(unpublished D.Phil. in Law thesis, St. John's College, Oxford University). 
66 Commonwealth Environmental Protection Agency, National Pollutant Inventory: 
What it Means to You (1996). 
67 See, e.g., the Canadian Pest Control Products Act, 1985; and Article 4 of the 
1996 revisions to the Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping 
of Wastes and Other Matter. 
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activities and levels of pollutants without detrimental change to overall 
quality. For example, for a concerned resident to succeed in prohibiting 
a development application where planning guidelines have been met, he 
or she typically is required to adduce evidence to show that the activity 
would result in impermissible environmental harm, rather than the 
developer being required to establish that the activity is unlikely to 
result in such harm. The principle is, at least in its strictest forms, quite 
a radical departure from traditional concepts of property law which 
have developed out of a perception that the environment is a resource to 
exploit rather than to conserve; and as a result, it requires innovative 
methods to be implemented.68 The principle is a stated aim of 
virtually all environmental policy documents and its expression in 
environmental legislation is commonplace, yet attention now needs to 
shift to the task of assisting decision-makers to implement precaution. 
A Precautionary Option: Environmental Impact Assessment 
The need to integrate the precautionary principle systematically in 
decision-making requires us to examine the potential to include it in 
existing environmental protection measures. EIA is the most 
sophisticated environmental protection framework that exists in many 
jurisdictions, and therefore, it is arguably the most obvious vehicle for 
giving effect to the principle and the logical starting point for reform 
options. In 1974, Australia became the second country, after the U. S., 
to introduce legislative EIA measures. EIA has become an established 
component in the planning process for most major developments in 
Australia, and it is the only federal legislative process which provides 
expressly for environmental considerations to be taken into account in 
developmental decision-making. The purpose of EIA is that matters 
affecting the environment are fully examined and taken into account so 
that activities avoid or minimize anticipated adverse environmental 
effects. The hallmark of the process is its institutionalisation of 
foresight. It introduces consideration of environmental factors as a 
condition precedent to planning decisions.69 Not only are the 
precautionary principle and EIA complementary in so far as they are 
68 See Barton, supra note 48, at 542. 
69 For more detail on Australian EIA, see Nick Harvey, Environmental Impact 
Assessment: Procedures, Practice, and Prospects in Australia (1998). 
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both means of informing decision-making, but EIA itself is also 
precautionary in a minimal sense because it is predicated on addressing 
uncertainty about future environmental effects,70 although one 
concern often expressed is that in practice EIAs tend to be poor in 
identifying knowledge gaps and uncertainties.71 Feedback 
mechanisms of post-decision monitoring in good EIA processes fulfill 
the learning goal of adaptive management. Further, subsequent EIAs of 
similar proposals enable the transfer of experience across departments, 
developers and practitioners. 
Connections between EIA and sustainable development have been 
made for more than a decade, including by the World Commission on 
Environment and Development in the 1987 Brundtland Report.72 
There is consensus among environmental planners and resource 
managers that EIA must reflect sustainable development principles 
more closely. However, little has been done in a formal capacity to 
effect this goal. The question is: "How can these practical steps be 
taken?" 
A three-step method is presented for integrating the precautionary 
principle, a key component of sustainable development, into legislative 
EIA processes/3 In sum, effective integration of the principle in 
current project-specific EIA requires three modifications to existing 
processes/4 They would need to ensure that: 
70 See James Cameron, The Precautionary Principle: Core Meaning, 
Comtitutional Framework and Procedures for Implementation. Paper presented at 
the Precautionary Principle Conference, Institute of Environmental Studies, The 
University of New South Wales, Sydney, September 20-21, 1993. 
71 See, e.g., David P. Lawrence, Quality and Effectiveness of Environmental 
Impact Assessments: Lessons and Insights from Ten Assessments in Canada, 12 
Project Appraisal 219 (1997). 
71 World Commission on Environment & Development, Our Common Future 
222 (1987). See also Australian & New Zealand Conservation Council, A National 
Approach to Environmental Impact Assessment in Australia (1991); Commonwealth 
of Australia, supra note 19; Owen McInryre & Thomas Mosedale, The 
Precautionary Principle as a Norm of Customary International Law, 9 J. of Envtl. L. 
221,238 (1997); ana Brown, supra note 10, at 31. 
73 For more detail on this argument see Gullett, supra note 5. 
74 The basic steps in the EIA process of project screening, scoping of impacts, 
description of proposal and environment affected, assessment of predicted impacts, 
community consultation, and post decision monitoring and auditing are, in general 
terms, more or less consistent in all EIA jurisdictions, although the detail within each 
step can vary considerably. 
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1. EIAs are conducted where there is uncertainty regarding 
environmental impacts; 
2. there is adequate assessment of environmental 
uncertainties; and 
3. environmental uncertainties are given appropriate weight 
in final decisions. 
Step 1: Threshold for Operation of EIA 
The first step to integrate the principle in EIA would be to amend 
the project screening criteria or threshold for operation of EIA to ensure 
that EIAs are not limited to activities which will affect the 
environment "to a significant extent" as is the common practice,?5 The 
EIA process must also be triggered where there is uncertainty regarding 
the possibility of serious environmental impact. Although the 
parameters of environmental uncertainty are elusive, particularly at the 
larger scale, guidelines could be prepared to render this threshold 
operable. This is where more work on risk assessment and uncertainty 
analysis needs to be undertaken. A lower evidentiary standard requiring 
EIAs where there is insufficient information available to predict whether 
non-negligible environmental harm may occur would reflect the 
principle in so far as it would shift attention from the acceptability of 
the "significance" of the environmental impacts of a proposal to the 
acceptability of the scientific uncertainty which attaches to the 
predictions of the impacts. 
Step 2: Content of EIA 
For the principle to be taken into account, the uncertainty 
associated with a proposal (concerning both what is known and not 
known) must explicitly be examined and evaluated in EIA. Yet, an 
essential prior ingredient for achieving precautionary EIAs is to ensure 
that feasible alternatives to the proposed activity are assessed and 
considered. It is necessary from a precautionary standpoint to consider 
alternatives, including the "no proposal" alternative, as a way to reduce 
environmental impacts by logical choice of best design options, rather 
than merely to assess actual predicted impacts of the sole option being 
considered. Most jurisdictions require or allow consideration of 
alternatives as part of their EIA process,?6 However, in practice, 
75 See, e.g., Environment Protection (Impact of Proposals) Act, 1974, § 5 (eth). 
76 See, e.g., NEPA, § 102(2)(c)(ii). For a review of consideration of alternatives in 
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particularly where EIA processes are largely discretionary, such as in 
Australia, the consideration of alternatives is a poorly performed step of 
EIA. Invariably few alternatives are considered, and those that are 
considered often are done so inadequately. This is because a developer 
will typically focus on its primary proposal, and momentum for the 
proposal is generated by the process itself.?7 Consideration of 
alternatives is the heart of a precautionary EIA process and should not 
merely be a pro forma procedural requirement. The focus should be to 
consider reasonable alternatives to the proposed action to enable 
identification and selection of less potentially harmful activities as a way 
of minimizing or reducing harm during the early design stage of the 
project. Precautionary decision-making would be facilitated by rigorous 
qualitative alternatives analysis. It would encourage evaluation of the 
purpose of the proposed activity in the first instance, rather than 
assuming that the activity will be approved and focusing on the best 
way to proceed.78 
The step focused on in this part is the assessment of uncertainty of 
the proposal and of practical alternatives. Determining how to assess 
and communicate uncertainty is the current challenge. In 1994, the 
Commonwealth Environment Protection Agency (EPA) advised the 
Australian Federal government to adopt the process the U.S. National 
Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA) utilizes for dealing with 
incomplete information and scientific uncertainty.79 These include 
disclosure requirements of incomplete information and consideration of 
more distant and uncertain effects.80 Added to this should be 
a number of national EIA processes, see Christopher Wood, Environmental Impact 
Assessment: A Comparative Review (1995). 
77 Including, for example, financial commitments to the project already made by 
this stage of the process and the often predetermined outcome of large scale projects 
which take on a political import. For discussion of the political nature of development 
issues in Australia, see e.g., David Mercer, 'A Question of Balance': Natural 
Resources Conflict Issues in Australia (2d ed. 1995). 
78 See Mary O'Brien, Alternatives Assessment: Part of Operationalizing and 
Institutionalizing the Precautionary Principle, in Protecting Public Health and the 
Environment: Implementing the Precautionary Principle 207 (C. Raffensperger & ]. 
Tickner eds., 1999). 
79 Environment Protection Agency, Analysis of Environmental Impact Assessment 
Practice and Procedures in other Countries 109 (1994). Among other things, NEPA 
requires that project or policy proponents look at "the relationship between local 
short-term use of man's environment and the maintenance and enhancement of long-
term productivity" (§ 1 02 (c) (IV)). 
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consideration of cumulative and synergistic effects. An important area 
here is for EIAs to analyze the potential for irreversible impacts from a 
proposed development. Despite the opportunity presented to the 
Federal government in 1998-99 to reform the federal EIA process 
according to the EPA's comprehensive review based recommendations, 
it failed to do so.81 
Another necessary step for EIAs to give effect to the essence of the 
principle that there be a shift in the "burden of proof"82 is that 
proponents should be required to establish that the uncertainties which 
attach to the predicted environmental effects of proposals are within 
predetermined precautionary "acceptability" criteria or "margin-of-
safety" standards. This burden would be more onerous to discharge 
where there is conflicting scientific evidence and may call for a sliding 
scale of required proof according to the predicted likelihood and 
severity of harm. It may be necessary, at minimum, to require a 
developer or potential polluter to establish that no safer way to conduct 
the activity is possible. 
Determining suitable ways to justify making decisions where 
uncertainty exists - typically anathema to decision-makers who 
invariably seek uncontested and "objective" information - is an area 
where more attention is needed in order to give the precautionary 
principle more cogency in decision-making generally, and in EIA in 
particular. Critical issues here are how to determine and express 
thresholds for appropriate precautionary responses and how best to 
communicate evidence of uncertainty to decision-makers who may not 
be well-informed about the nature of risk. For example, reason to 
believe that a causal link between an activity or pollutant and a negative 
environmental or health consequence can be expressed in different 
80 See 40 C.F.R. §§1502.22, 1508.27 and Mary K. Fitzgerald, Small-Handles, 
Big Impacts: When Should the National Environmental Policy Act Require an 
Environmental Impact Statement?, 23 Boston College Envtl. Affiiirs L. R. 437, 464 
(1996). 
81 Under EPBe Act, 1999, § 102(2), the Minister must merely "seek to ensure" 
that the environmental impact statement will "contain enough information about the 
[development] and its relevant impacts to allow the Minister to make an informed 
decision whether or not to approve." 
82 The principle is generally understood as shifting the burden of proof from 
environmentalists (that of proving that a development would cause significant harm) 
to developers (to prove that it would not cause such harm). 
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ways, depending on the strength of the evidence.83 This can range 
from statements such as "the evidence indicates/is consistent with a 
causal relation" through to areas of greater uncertainty about a 
connection expressed in statements like "there is no evidence bearing on 
a causal relation" or "the evidence does not indicate a causal relation." 
However, more appropriate ways to express the same degree of 
confidence about causal relations can facilitate the making of decisions 
based on them. Rather than stating that the evidence "is consistent 
with" a causal relation, this could be expressed as the evidence "favors 
acceptance of" a causal relation. Similarly, where the evidence is 
"insufficient to indicate" a causal relation, this could be expressed as the 
evidence "is inadequate to accept or reject" a causal relation. 
One area where risk assessment can improve is to provide for 
uncertainty in degrees of confidence to be expressed in statement form. 
This is to be preferred to assigning numbers to predictions of harm 
where uncertainty exists because numerical values create a false 
impression of precision where often none exists. This in turn can 
contribute to decisions being made more on political grounds where 
numbers, rather than meaning, tend to be focused upon.84 Statements 
about uncertainty have the benefit of compelling consideration being 
given to the nature of the evidence relied upon, for example, by 
specifically addressing issues such as the adequacy of the data and the 
level of scientific consensus about data analysis. As such, it is argued 
that the final document produced in the EIA process should express the 
degree of confidence of predictions and severity of harm in statement 
form so that rigorous uncertainty analysis and consideration is more 
amenable to the environmental approvals process. Although it is argued 
here that it is necessary for more attention to be devoted to assessing 
the uncertainties which attach to project options, it is important to 
recognize that uncertainty itself cannot be overcome because of its 
pervasive and cumulative nature in the environmental arena.8 5 
83 These arguments are drawn from David A. Butler, Communicating Uncertainty 
in Health Risks to Policy-Makers. Paper presented at the Second Biennial 
International Meeting of the Risk Assessment and Policy Association, Alexandria, 
Virginia, Mar. 25-26, 1999. 
84 For discussion of the discrepancies that exist between experts and the public in 
risk perception, see Ann Bostrom, Risk Perceptions: 'Experts' vs. 'Lay People', 8 
Duke Envtl. L. & Pol'y F. 101 (1997). 
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Therefore, the crucial task that follows that of assessing and conveying 
uncertainty in EIA is that of how to ensure that decisions are influenced 
by the uncertainty. 
Step 3: Substantive Influence on Decision-Making 
To achieve the stated aim of implementing precaution, it is 
imperative that a procedure is adopted whereby precaution actually 
influences or governs decisions. This task strikes at the core of the 
precautionary principle. In an era in which decision-making is aimed to 
be rational - particularly in the fields of law and public administration 
- any attempt to base decision-making in part on the absence of 
information is bound to cause concern. Yet, this is exactly what the 
principle instructs us to do. It is unsatisfactory to have a process 
whereby uncertainty is assessed, but not considered adequately in final 
determinations. 
Australian EIA processes, being far more discretionary than, for 
example, the EIA process contained in NEPA requires considerable 
: attention in this regard.8 6 A legal rule needs to be formulated 
requiring the prohibition of an activity or the implementation of other 
appropriate precautionary measures where the threshold for application 
of the principle is met, unless there is sufficient evidence that the level 
of uncertainty involved (not merely risk) is acceptable. This could take 
the form of a legislative presumption that the responsible decision-
maker adopts the appropriate precautionary response, preferably 
recommended in the environmental impact statement itself or possibly 
determined by an expert independent review panel. 87 
85 See R. Michael M'Gonigle, The Political Economy of Precaution, in Protecting 
Public Health and the Environment: Implementing the Precautionary Principle 123 
(C. Raffensperger & J. Tickner eds., 1999). 
86 Despite being modelled on NEPA, the Australian federal EIA process (as well as 
most state processes) dispensed with mandatory procedural requirements because the 
government was anxious to avoid the adoption of provisions which might enable the 
courts to he the common forum to resolve development disputes, thus causing delays 
and increasing the cost of the process. For statutory reform proposals for NEPA in 
relation to guiding political decisions and requiring agencies to justifY decisions, see 
Philip Michael Ferester, Revitalizing the National Environmental Policy Act: 
Substantive Law Adaptions from NEPA s Progeny, 16 Harvard Envtl. L.R. 207 
(1992) and Lynton K Caldwell, Beyond NEPA: Future Significance of the National 
Environmental Policy Act, 22 Harvard Envtl. L.R. 203 (1998). 
87 This could be achieved in a manner similar to the "bounded" decision-making 
established in Canada under the innovative Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, 
1995, § 37(1)(b). See Gullett, supra note 11 at 154. 
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However, to enable a utilitarian approach to the principle, this 
presumption would be displaced if compelling reasons are given as to 
why, in the instant case, precautionary recommendations should not be 
followed. This process would be a combination of indirect and direct 
precautionary measures. Steps one and two would assist in creating a 
climate fostering precautionary thinking, while step three would be 
more direct by presumptively requiring application of precaution in 
appropriate circumstances. 
Although in some cases this procedure would enable precautionary 
recommendations to be avoided because it allows contra arguments to 
be raised, the principle has never been considered to have mandatory 
application in all situations. A threshold for application does need to be 
determined below which non-precautionary decisions can be taken.88 
However, even where the threshold is met, it would be too arbitrary to 
allow precaution to be the sole criterion for decision-making. Rather, it 
should be a significant criterion with presumptive application in 
appropriate circumstances with the level of precaution required being 
related to the level of uncertainty involved. The approach outlined here 
would ensure that uncertainty is expressly taken into account and that 
the necessary balancing act of environmental, economic and social issues 
is undertaken not simply by considering available scientific evidence, 
but also by being critical of such evidence and taking into account the 
absence of scientific data, uncertainty and indeterminancy. This would 
create more coherence where decision-making is, and will remain, 
subjective, and EIA would become a truly precautionary process. 
Conclusion 
In Australia, the precautionary principle has been adopted widely in 
environmental policy and legislation, and it has been accepted 
tentatively by the courts as a factor that should be taken into account in 
appropriate circumstances. In this respect, Australia is a leading country 
in the adoption of the principle as a main plank of environmental 
protection. However, although other countries can draw from the 
Australian experience with the principle (particularly in relation to the 
88 See James Cameron, Will Wade-Gery and Juli Abouchar, Precautionary 
Principle and Future Generations, in Future Generations and International Law 93, 
100 (E. Agius & S. Busuttil eds., 1998). 
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inclusion of it in legislation), it is submitted that the Australian 
approach needs to be more rigorous to ensure that environmental 
practice is informed by precaution and to ensure that the precautionary 
principle amounts to more than a "guiding" principle. 
Australian environmental protection measures do not as yet evince 
any remarkable degree of innovation in attempting to move away from 
conventional regulatory approaches - targeting actors, establishing 
causes of action, and apportioning liability in a procedural manner - to 
embracing novel methods of dealing with fundamental causes of 
environmental harm (which involve profound uncertainty and complex, 
poorly understood structural issues). The principle needs to be 
expressed in such a way that it can be applied in specific environmental 
management and resource decisions. Formulations such as those 
contained in the Rio Declaration and the IGAE, although useful for 
advancing precautionary thinking, will not enable us to meet the 
principle's most important test - implementation. Formulations which 
are imprecise, although popularizing precaution, inhibit the 
development of operational strategies. Reform options are available to 
implement precaution within existing decision-making structures. An 
effective approach would be to enshrine the principle in EIA legislation 
- a task which is not procedurally difficult. However, while many 
precautionary principle advocates lament the fact that implementation 
of it is poor, it is imperative to recognize its revolutionary character so 
that suitable operational strategies can be devised. 
